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It can only be speculated as to how far the principal cases go
towards resolving the troublesome problems involved in incustody
interrogation. It would appear that the decision should go far in
that respect, in that, outside the area of waivers of constitutional
privileges, the Court's guide lines are fairly narrow and should
not be unnecessarily hard to apply. In the coming months Miranda
and its antecedents will provide fuel for heated discussion on the
respective rights of the community, the accused, and the police.
Hopefully, after these discussions have quieted, there will be
implanted in our criminal jurisprudence a fair and workable balance of the rights of the community, the accused, and the police,
all within the meaning and intent of the constitutional provisions.
George Lawson Partain

Constitutional Law-Establishing Student's Domicile
For Voting Purposes
A student at the University of Virginia applied for registration
to vote, alleging that he had resided in Virginia beyond the statutory period and that he was no longer registered to vote in Florida.
When the application was denied by the county registrar, the
student filed a petition in the circuit court to have his right to
vote determined. The circuit court ruled that the applicant was
entitled to vote. Held, reversed. Although the Constitution of
Virginia provides that a student is not deemed to have gained or
lost his right to vote because of his status as a student, he must
satisfy the dual domiciliary requirements of presence and intention
to be entitled to vote in Virginia. The voter must show an intention
to abandon the old domicile and a corresponding intent to remain
in the new domicile for an indefinite period of time. That the
applicant did not have such intention was indicated by his testimony that he had no definite plans to remain in Virginia, his
payment of out-of-state tuition and his failure to show that he
was no longer registered in Florida. Kegley v. Johnson, 147 S.E.2d
735 (Va. 1966).
In order to vote in a new election district, the prospective voter
must establish a domicile in the election district in which he
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seeks to vote.' The terms "domicile" and "residence" are generally
considered synonymous when used in reference to voter registration laws.2 Generally, to acquire a new domicile for voting purposes, one must: (1) be physically present in the new domicile
for a specified period of time; (2) have an intent to abandon the
old domicile; and (3) have a corresponding intent to remain in
the new domicile for an indefinite period of time. Once domicile
is acquired it is presumed to continue until the party alleging
the change of domicile presents sufficient proof to rebut the
presumption.' Although the degree of proof required to rebut
the presumption is not a uniform principle, the domiciliary intention of the prospective voter is the controlling factor in the
determination of the right to vote in all jurisdictions.5 Consideration is given to the objective as well as the subjective intent
indicated by the would be voter.6 Thus, the right to vote depends
upon the establishment of domicile and domicile depends on
the intention of the prospective voter.
It is uniformly held that where a student resides in a university
or college town for the sole purpose of obtaining an education,
intending to return to his former home, he is not permitted to vote
in the university district.7 Conversely, if the student evidences
an intent to make the university town his "new" home, he is
permitted to vote because he has an intent to establish domicile
independent of the initial purpose of acquiring an education.8
When a student has no definite plans concerning his future
residence, most jurisdictions have allowed the student to vote in
the university district." The rationale stated by one court revolves
on the theory that, when study is the purpose of a residence in a
certain location, there always exists the ulterior intention of residICarrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); People v. Turpin, 49 Colo.
234, 112 Pac. 539 (1910).
2 Berry v. Wilcox, 44 Neb. 82, 62 N.W. 249 (1895).
3
People v. Turpin, 49 Colo. 234, 112 Pac. 539 (1910).
4 Welch v. Shuniway, 232 IM. 54, 83 N.E. 549 (1908).
5
Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill.
164, 146 N.E. 171 (1924); Nelson v. Gass,
27 N.D.
357, 146 N.W. 537 (1914).
6
In re Goodman, 146 N.Y. 284, 40 N.E. 769 (1895); Sanders v. Getchell,
76 Me.
158 (1884).
7
Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 220 S.W.2d 592 (1949); Seibold v.
Wahl, 164 Wis. 82, 159 N.W. 546 (1916).
8 Robbins v. Chamberlain, 297 N.Y. 108, 75 N.E.2d 617 (1947); Sanders
v. Getchell,
76 Me. 158 (1884).
9
Welsh v. Shumway, 232 IlM. 54, 83 N.E. 549 (1908); Berry v. Wilcox,
44 Neb. 82, 62 N.W. 249 (1895).
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ing permanently in that location."° Those courts adhering to this
holding, however, have required that the student show an intention
not to return to his old domicile."
However, a few jurisdictions have adopted more conservative
criteria for intention. In these instances, the courts have required
that the student manifest an intention to remain in the university
district for an indefinite period of time. 2 Consequently, a student
whose future residence is uncertain is denied voting privileges
in these jurisdictions.
The Kegley decision is susceptible to two interpretations. The
court stated that if the student had proved the allegations in his
complaint, a different decision might have resulted. Consequently,
the failure of the student to adduce testimony that he had given
up his previous registration may have indicated to the court that
the student failed to show abandonment of his old domicile.
However, the court stated that the student's testimony illustrated
"clearly and conclusively" that his intention to remain in Virginia
was "only for a fixed period of time . . . and not to remain

indefinitely for the purpose of malking the county his home." This
language suggests that the Virginia court chose to ignore the
decisions of other jurisdictions relating to the lack of definite plans
concerning future residence and instead adopted the minority rule
that requires a student to declare definitely his domicile in the
university situs.
It should be noted that some serious consequences may result
from the adoption of the minority rule. In some jurisdictions
courts have held that when a student is absent from his own
3
district for a long period of time, he loses his right to vote.'
Intention is again the governing factor, and the courts have
held that it may be inferred from a person's actions. Thus,
where the party clearly indicates that his intention is. to acquire
a new domicile, his right to vote is lost in the old domicile.
This effect has been achieved in West Virginia by a statute which

"0State ex rel. Kaplan v. Kuhn, 11 Ohio Dec. 321, 8 Ohio N.P. 197
(Hamilton C.P. 1901).

" Welsh v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 83 N.E. 549 (1908); Berry v. Wilcox,

44 Neb. 82 62 N.W. 249 (1895).
12
'3

Vanaerpool v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa 246, 5 N.W. 119 (1880).
See In re Sugar Creek Local School Dist., 21 Ohio Op. 2d 16, 90 Ohio

L. Abs. 257, 185 N.E.2d 809 (C.P. 1962); Frakes v. Farragut Community
School Dist., 255 Iowa 88, 121 N.W.2d 636 (1963).
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provides that when a person fails to vote at least once during
a period covering two primary and two general elections, his
name shall be stricken from the registration records.14 Therefore,
it is conceivable that a situation might arise where the student
would be denied his right to vote altogether. Suppose S, the
student, has lived and voted in Ohio. S marries and goes to Virginia to attend school. S is uncertain where he will reside upon
the completion of his education, so he attempts to register in
Virginia. On the basis of these facts, S could be questioned as a
voter in Ohio because of his continued absence for a long period
of time. He could possibly be denied the right to vote in Virginia
since he is uncertain of his future domicile. Consequently S becomes the victim of a judicial dilemma.
The problem presented by the Kegley decision apparently has
not been presented to the West Virginia Supreme Court. The
West Virginia Constitution provides that a person is not eligible
to vote unless he has been a resident of this state for one year
and a resident of the county in which he desires to register for
sixty days preceding the election in which he wants to vote. 5
According to the opinion propounded by one Attorney General,
a person's residence for voting purposes is a matter of his own
choosing.16 Furthermore, the West Virginia court has stated that
voter registration laws should be construed liberally, favoring the
right to vote.17 More specifically, a federal court in West Virginia
has held that a change of domicile depends on an intention to
remain in the new one for a definite or indefinite period.18 The
West Virginia Supreme Court has stated it is not necessary to
intend to stay indefinitely in the new domicile to effect a change.
One may have a mental reservation or an indistinct purpose to
leave at some future date. Domicile changes when the intention
to return to the old domicile ceases.19 This reasoning is similar to
that used by those courts which have permitted a student to vote
where: (1) the student did not know where his future residence
would be located; and (2) the student did not intend to return
home. The reasonable inference is that the West Virginia Court
14W.
VA. CODE ch. 3, art. 2, § 3 (Michie 1961).
15
W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

16 1923-1924 W. VA. AT'Y GEN. BmNNr. REP. 647.
17 See Funkhauser v. Lanfried, 124 W. Va. 654, 22 S.E.2d 353 (1942).
18 See Jardine v. Intehar, 213 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. W. Va. 1963)
(diversity jurisdiction).
19 Cf. Gartin v. Coal & Coke Co., 72 W. Va. 405, 78 S.E. 673 (1913).
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would permit a student to vote if he complied with the constitutional requirements and evidenced an intent not to return home.
Another factor supporting this position is the absence of a constitutional provision directly relating to student voting. As stated
by a former Attorney General, once a prospective voter complies
with the constitution, it would take a strong showing to deny
that person his right to vote.2" However, only the West Virginia
Supreme Court can determine when a voter has complied with
the constitution.
Jacob Michael Robinson

Evidence-Expert Opinion of Speed Based on
Damaged Condition of Vehicle
P's intestate was involved in a three car collision at an intersection. A police officer with four years experience on the police
force investigated the accident shortly after it occurred. The
officer was asked if he had formed an opinion, based on the
physical damage to the automobiles and the tire marks in the
intersection, whether the automobile driven by P's intestate was
moving or standing still at the time of the collision. D's objection
to the question was sustained and P was non-suited. Held, affirmed. Where a witness investigates but does not see a wreck,
he may describe to the jury signs, marks and conditions found at
the scene, including damage to the vehicle involved. These
observations, however, cannot provide a basis for an opinion by
the witness concerning the vehicle's speed because the jury is as
well qualified as the witness to determine what inferences the
facts will permit or require. Farrow v. Baugham, 266 N.C. 739,
147 S.E.2d 167 (1966).
It is within the discretion of the trial court to ascertain whether
a witness has the degree of skill, knowledge or experience not
common to laymen in a particular field that will qualify him as an
expert.' However, before the expert may render an opinion, it
must be shown that the subject matter is so distinctly related to

some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond
20 1923-1924 W. VA. Ar'Ty GEN. BmiNNAL REP. 647.

' Byrd v. Virginian By., 123 W. Va; 47, 13 S.E.2d 273 (1941).
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